Abstract. In this paper, we present a design strategy of elliptic curves whose extension degrees needed for reduction attacks have a controllable lower boundary, based on the complex multiplication fields method of Atkin and Morain over prime fields.
Introduction
In recent years, elliptic curves have been used to define a new category of discrete logarithm problems, in hope to build new one-way functions instead of the existing cryptographic functions An elliptic curve over a field K , E / K is defined by the Weierstrass canonical form 2 E / K y2 + U l I y + U 3 y = Z3 + U 2 Z + U 4 E + a6 ( U I , U 2 , U 4 , a6 E K ) . (1) When char(K) # 2 , 3 , E / K can be transformed by an isomorphism to a form of E / K : y2 = z3 + ax + b ( a , b E K ) .
(2) The discrete logarithm problem over an elliptic curve E / K is to find z E 2 such that for P, Q E E / K , Q = xP. Hereafter we will assume that char(K) = p.
The above problems are expected to provide a new cryptographic function with stronger integrity and have been applied to build cryptosystems. Until now, two algorithms are known as attacks on the problems: the Baby-step-Giant-step algorithm [4] and the MOV reduction [ 5 ] .
The first method by Shanks costs O( d m l o g # E ( K ) ) of fully exponential time. Its fast versions, e.g. Pohligh-Hellman's algorithm [6] reduced the computation to order of the root of the maximum prime factor of # E ( K ) . If the maximum prime factor is smaller than log#E(K), it costs O((log#E(K))2) and becomes a very powerful method.
The second algorithm by Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone uses the Weil pairing to embed the discrete logarithm problems over E ( F , ) into the classic discrete logarithm problems over certain extension of the ground field F p k , which then can be solved by efficient algorithms such as Adleman's index algorithm [7] of subexponential time. This approach works when the extension degree of the ground field required for a well-defined embedding is very low.
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To defend the elliptic-curves-based cryptosystems against the first attack, the order of elliptic curves # E ( K ) has to contain a large prime factor. As t o the second attack, it is known that for a class of elliptic curves called super-singular curves, the reduction can be fulfilled with extension of 6 degree of the ground field [5] . The super-singular curves however are in fact very few. For the ordinary or non-super-singular curves, it is shown in [8] that with high probability, the extension degrees of the ground field needed for reduction attack on random curves are an exponential function of char(F) = p . However, this is an asymptotic conclusion and not directly applicable to a fixed prime p [S]. In cryptosystem design practice, it would be desirable to find some strategy to control the lower bound of the extension degree for particular curves defined over fixed fields.
In this paper, we consider about the extension degree of ground fields which is needed to reduce discrete logarithm problems over elliptic curves to discrete logarithm problems over finite fields. Then we show an algorithm to design elliptic curves over primary fields which can control the extension degree for the reduction attack. This algorithm is based on the complex multiplication field method by Atkin and Morain [9] [10] . (Both the algorithms can also be generalized over extension fields [ll] .)
Current Design Methods of Curves
Below we review popular design methods of elliptic curves. In this algorithm, the order calculation part is of most costly, which requires O((1og p)') computations by Schoof's algorithm. This becomes awkward when p is large. Recently, progresses have appeared in development of fast order calculation algorithms. However, the order-counting problem seems to be difficult for curves with arbitrary orders. One way to avoid this difficulty is to choose an order first which is "easy" in certain sense and with desired cryptographic property, then build a curve with such order. This is the method by Atkin and Morain. Thus, this algorithm can only be used for small class number cases. Under this condition, curves with the order equals to the characteristic or contains a large prime factor are built in [15] [16] . The curve used in [15] is interesting because it can resist any reduction attacks. However, there is only one isogeny class of such curves over a prime field. (Although much richer isogeny classes of pdivisible curves exist over extension fields [17] ). Besides, in order to make the class number small, one has l o restrict the prime p to meet certain conditions. For the same reason, isogeny classes of curves are also restricted. On the other hand, it seems that to build curves without using Schoof's algorithm could be computationally attractive.
Extension Degree against Reduction Attack

Design of Curves with Controlled Lower Boundary of
To control t h e extension degree for the reduction attack, we choosc the following strategy, i.e., to specify a lower boundary B of the extension degree for the reduction attack, then design a curve with the order satisfies this lower boundary.
First we consider the extension degree for the reduction attack on non-y divisible curves.
The condition for any well-defined reduction to F,p with m = # E ( F , ) is that m l g k -l
or qk I mod m (4) By Euler's theorem, the minimum IF satisfies (4) must a factor of cp(rn). Thus, take the primary factorization of cp(rn), one can find the minimum factor satisfy (4), then find the minimum k. However, the primary factorization of p(m) is then necessary, which could become a new computational burden. Now we give a condition of order rn for the extension degree to be larger than B. In this way, curves of order sl are derived.
In Stepl, to search for B-nonsmooth 1 need about (log l)(log B ) primality tests. (f) = 1 holds in probability of 1/2. Once (4) = 1 is true, there are plenty of solutions for Step2. Assuming p is random, Step 3 will repeat about logp times to pass the check. (In simulation it seems quite easy.)
[Example] 
